From 628046738b0e4f410c639dd4844925ff044c79d2fb14b0e42722f1bee733f1ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Johnson Date: Mon, 27 May 2024 00:00:00 +0000 Subject: Fix tons of links --- content/entry/making-sense-of-metaethics.md | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'content/entry/making-sense-of-metaethics.md') diff --git a/content/entry/making-sense-of-metaethics.md b/content/entry/making-sense-of-metaethics.md index d1e86f5..401f9ef 100644 --- a/content/entry/making-sense-of-metaethics.md +++ b/content/entry/making-sense-of-metaethics.md @@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ So far so obvious. Now let's move into the most controversial section of this en ## Interpreting Moral Language Moral language like "should", "ought", "good", "evil", "right", and "wrong" should be interpreted as signalling either alignment or misalignment between values and actions. So if I say "You shouldn't play the lottery." what I mean is that you playing the lottery runs contrary to my values somehow. One plausible reason is that I care about your well being. I know your well being will probably be worse if you have less money and that playing the lottery will probably cause you to lose money. -There are other ways to interpret moral language which I do give some credence. [Emotivism](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism) suggests that moral statements express feelings. [Prescriptivism](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_prescriptivism) proposes viewing moral statements as imperatives. +There are other ways to interpret moral language which I do give some credence. [Emotivism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism) suggests that moral statements express feelings. [Prescriptivism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_prescriptivism) proposes viewing moral statements as imperatives. I agree that moral language can also express emotions and imperatives. My interpretation is fully compatible with that. But the problem with interpreting moral statements entirely as expressions of emotion or entirely as imperatives is that **people use moral statements as statements of fact**. My claim is that the facts moral statements refer to are facts about how certain actions affect one's values. ## Refuting Hume's Guillotine -At this point, I'd like to address some likely criticism, namely [Hume's Guillotine](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem). For those who don't know, Hume's Guillotine is the idea that you can't derive an "ought" from an "is". In other words, no description of how the world is tells you how it should be. It's a strict separation of facts and values. +At this point, I'd like to address some likely criticism, namely [Hume's Guillotine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem). For those who don't know, Hume's Guillotine is the idea that you can't derive an "ought" from an "is". In other words, no description of how the world is tells you how it should be. It's a strict separation of facts and values. -Under my interpretation of moral language, [values are facts](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism). There's no distinction. As long as I value my health, I should exercise. That's a fact. If anyone disagrees, I'd be happy to reference the science that shows exercise improves health. "But science can't prove that it's Good to be healthy." I value my health. No further justification is necessary. +Under my interpretation of moral language, [values are facts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism). There's no distinction. As long as I value my health, I should exercise. That's a fact. If anyone disagrees, I'd be happy to reference the science that shows exercise improves health. "But science can't prove that it's Good to be healthy." I value my health. No further justification is necessary. Hume says "You can't get an ought from an is." I say "The is *is* the ought." **Values are facts about what we care about and moral statements are facts about the effects of different actions on those values.** How else could moral statements possibly be interpreted while also lining up with how they're actually used? @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ I won't bother going into more detail on that since a very good book has already ## Well Being In The Moral Landscape, Sam starts with well being as his ethical foundation. So let's talk about how that works in my moral semantics. -First, I'll start with the observation that [any level of intelligence is compatible with almost any intrinsic value/goal](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthogonality_thesis). Humans though, as products of evolution by natural selection, share anthropomorphic goals. Generally speaking, we want to promote well being for ourselves and others. +First, I'll start with the observation that [any level of intelligence is compatible with almost any intrinsic value/goal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthogonality_thesis). Humans though, as products of evolution by natural selection, share anthropomorphic goals. Generally speaking, we want to promote well being for ourselves and others. As a matter of convenience, we make the (usually correct) assumption that whoever we're dealing with has similar intrinsic values to us and thus we can attempt to reason with them. In the case of psychopaths, this may not be true. But they're rare enough that it doesn't matter. So I take no issue with Sam's starting with well being as the entry point for thinking about ethical questions. -- cgit v1.2.3