From 62ce2c3a30726734f4bd9e92e0f5db27612e0d15ee0cd0eb6c106afa96bc56d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Johnson Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000 Subject: Add tag 'computing' --- content/entry/re-dkim-show-your-privates.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'content/entry/re-dkim-show-your-privates.md') diff --git a/content/entry/re-dkim-show-your-privates.md b/content/entry/re-dkim-show-your-privates.md index cceef82..3aac7b1 100644 --- a/content/entry/re-dkim-show-your-privates.md +++ b/content/entry/re-dkim-show-your-privates.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Re: DKIM: Show Your Privates" date: 2023-03-15T00:00:00 +tags: ['computing'] draft: false --- I recently read Ryan Castellucci's blog post, "[DKIM: Show Your Privates](https://rya.nc/dkim-privates.html)". The problem Ryan points out is that DKIM, which signs outgoing emails as a way to to reduce spam, has a negative unintended consequence: it's harder to deny that you sent an email if it gets leaked. As Ryan points out, saner messaging protocols like [OTR](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging) and the [Double Ratchet Algorithm](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_Ratchet_Algorithm) do implement cryptographic deniability of messages. -- cgit v1.2.3