From 8c394708651dbe47bcea94012d8d67c4231afd9edbdcd1be21ed27ad6462f1d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Johnson Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000 Subject: Replace underscore w/hyphen for filename consistency --- content/entry/dead-mans-switch.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'content/entry') diff --git a/content/entry/dead-mans-switch.md b/content/entry/dead-mans-switch.md index 2817922..69c394f 100644 --- a/content/entry/dead-mans-switch.md +++ b/content/entry/dead-mans-switch.md @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ In theory the DMS represents a sequential, [noncooperative game](https://en.wiki This point structure assumes both Players value retribution but not as much as avoiding harm. Both Players assume the other will adopt the strategy of maximizing their own points. Using the [Minimax](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax#Example_2) algorithm it can be determined that both Players will do nothing. Any other action would result in both players having less points. Points are represented for each Player in the format (P1,P2) in the decision tree below: -[decision_tree [IMG]](/decision_tree.jpg) +[decision-tree [IMG]](/decision-tree.jpg) ## In Practice In practice there are a number of complicating factors. Player 2 may not know exactly what the leaks contain making it impossible to value the cost of violence. Player 1 can create the perception of cost but in reality not even set up the switch or set one up incorrectly so it doesn't work or simply forget to deactivate it thus triggering it. Player 2 may find a way to disarm it. To account for the real-world outcomes you would need a much larger decision tree. And even then what are the chances that both players act rationally? So don't think that a DMS is guaranteed to be effective. -- cgit v1.2.3