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---
title: "Re: DKIM: Show Your Privates"
date: 2023-03-15T00:00:00
+tags: ['computing']
draft: false
---
I recently read Ryan Castellucci's blog post, "[DKIM: Show Your Privates](https://rya.nc/dkim-privates.html)". The problem Ryan points out is that DKIM, which signs outgoing emails as a way to to reduce spam, has a negative unintended consequence: it's harder to deny that you sent an email if it gets leaked. As Ryan points out, saner messaging protocols like [OTR](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging) and the [Double Ratchet Algorithm](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_Ratchet_Algorithm) do implement cryptographic deniability of messages.