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diff --git a/content/entry/an-objection-to-my-metaethics.md b/content/entry/an-objection-to-my-metaethics.md index 2aedc6f..9f2df5f 100644 --- a/content/entry/an-objection-to-my-metaethics.md +++ b/content/entry/an-objection-to-my-metaethics.md @@ -24,6 +24,6 @@ The values that you say I am "smuggling in" are that moral language should be us I'm open to the idea that my formulation of metaethics (referring to values) may not be the best moral semantics for satisfying my own criteria, but if you don't even care about moral language being useful to begin with, then I don't know what else to say to you. We need some way in language to talk about shared values and goals. -Just as we all accept the fundamental axiomatic [Laws of Thought](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_thought) so we can reason logically and go about our day, the idea that language needs to be useful is also properly basic in some sense. Just as there's no non-contradictory way of expressing one's rejection of the Laws of Thought, there's also no non-contradictory way of expressing that language needn't be useful. How could one even express such a thought without first having useful language to express it with? +Just as we all accept the fundamental axiomatic [Laws of Thought](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_thought) so we can reason logically and go about our day, the idea that language needs to be useful is also properly basic in some sense. Just as there's no non-contradictory way of expressing one's rejection of the Laws of Thought, there's also no non-contradictory way of expressing that language needn't be useful. How could one even express such a thought without first having useful language to express it with? You're free not to accept properly basic claims, but frankly I think that's just silly kindergarten philosophy that leads us nowhere. So I stand by the criteria I outlined which a good moral semantics should possess and I continue thinking that what I've said regarding my interpretation of moral semantics is at least a decent approximation to what people really mean when they use moral language and to what's useful. |